The death of a 14-year-old ‘militant’ in Shopian is both unjustified and unjustifiable

1024 768 Javaid Trali

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Had the so-called “militant” been caught alive, he could have provided very meaningful insight into what are the motivations of the children for joining militancy.

Javaid Trali

“It’s sad, really sad that a 14-year-old militant has been killed.” This is how a friend informed me about the encounter in which three Al-Badr militants, including a minor, Faisal Ahmad Ganaie, who had joined militancy just three days back (or perhaps was just with two other militants at the time of the encounter), were killed in the orchards of Reban Bandpawa area of south Kashmir’s Shopian district.

“Yes, it is sad, but more than that it’s both unjustified and unjustifiable,” I replied.

Why did I say what I said?

It’s unjustified and unjustifiable because a little boy who cannot even open and operate a savings bank account of his own, and needs parental consent and an attesting counter signature from them or some adult guardian for almost everything, has been lured into fighting big state war games.

It’s unjustified and unjustifiable because the books and the pens in his little hand were replaced by a gun. It’s unjustified and unjustifiable because his getting involved in the militancy wouldn’t have been a sudden development. The chances are, whatever the reason for joining the militancy, that there certainly would have been some signals and indications about his outlook and appetite for violence. It’s unjustified and unjustifiable that his parents and relatives did not pick up these signs earlier, even when they knew of his relationship with a militant friend and relative who was also killed in the encounter – and who, police believe, might have lured the little kid to join militancy.

The death is unjustified and unjustifiable because it proves that the parents are losing their leverage and control over their kids – sometimes just because they are not able to strike a balance between affection and attention.

It’s unjustified and unjustifiable because in south Kashmir districts, despite all the mayhem and bloodshed the militancy has brought in, it’s still eulogized and glorified, and has been made part of the local lore.

It’s unjustified and unjustifiable because the underage boys, with all the power that a gun-in-hand brings, have been let loose to decide who should live and who should die.

It’s unjustified and unjustifiable because in the absence of hope and motivation for a meaningful life, and also driven by politico-religious radicalization, the young people are opting for violence as a tool and means for lending some significance to what would otherwise be an inconsequential existence.

It’s unjustified and unjustifiable because even after three decades of violence and sure-loser confrontations which have not yielded even a little bit of political dividend for them  — instead, they have lost whatever little political capital they had started with – the people of Kashmir are not waking up to political manipulations and machinations they have been subjected to over the years. It’s unjustified and unjustifiable that the people continue to provide cannon fodder, by way of their children and the young people, to a war that’s primarily not theirs – in fact, it never was.

It’s unjustified and unjustifiable because the security forces take pride in counting the “hits” (the number of militants killed) because each hit also has a certain financial and career incentive attached to it – Apart from larger national and strategic interests.

It’s unjustified and unjustifiable because the men in uniform have neither the nerve nor patience to wait for the surrender of militants. In the instant of Sunday’s encounter, the security forces did appeal to the militants to surrender, but once their repeated offers were refused by the trapped militants, the security forces resorted to the easy and quick-fix solution they knew the best – they killed them.

Police said an AK-56 rifle, two pistols (some reports suggested only two weapons) and other ‘incriminating materials were recovered from the site of encounter. So this admission about the recoveries makes it clear that had the security forces chosen to wait, they could have easily caught all the three militants including the minor one alive.

After all, how long could have the three retaliated with one rifle and two (maybe just one) pistols? Common sense has it that they would have exhausted substantial portions of available ammunition during the initial stages of the armed bout. In no case, at the time they were gunned down, they would most certainly have been low on ammunition and couldn’t have held for long. A patient wait for another hour or two would have saved three lives and yielded a big strategic advantage.

It’s unjustified and unjustifiable that the military establishment, including of course the police, have not learnt to do such calculations even after over 30 years of consistent fight with militancy here. Had the so-called militant been caught alive, he could have provided very meaningful insight into what are the motivations of the children for joining militancy.

The security forces claim that the little militant was ready to surrender “but the other militants did not allow him to do so”. Had he been caught alive, this claim, which would now forever remain speculation or an allegation, could have been attested by the victim himself. This would have been an important indictment of not only the other militants but also of the militancy in general, and would have lent an authenticated credibility to the prevalence of coercion, force and blackmail within the militant ranks. It’s bad that a big opportunity was squandered.

It’s unjustified and unjustifiable because the security forces despite having the know-how and wherewithal to affect surrenders, do not exercise this option as often and as frequently as they should.

In the past week, when some militants were holed up inside a Jama Masjid in Shopian, in a congested neighbourhood of the town, and we’re not ready to surrender, security forces so programmed their operation that they could neutralize five heavily armed militants with minimal damage to the Masjid.

“Against the established practice of maintaining a safe distance from the target area, the army took the decision to move towards the mosque. The intention was to engage in pinpoint and not random, distant firing. Our main concern was to preserve the sanctity of the Masjid while neutralising the terrorists. This exposed our troops to a high degree of risk while engaging with the terrorists, who were heavily armed,” said Maj Gen Rashim Bali, General officer in Command of Victor Force that looks after militancy in the south and central Kashmir.

In Reban Bandpawa, only three militants with one rifle and two pistols were holed up in an open orchard, and they could not be caught alive. This is what makes it unjustified and unjustifiable.

It’s also unjustified and unjustifiable because this is not the first instance of a minor boy getting involved in militancy. There have been similar instances in the past as well. It’s unjustified and unjustifiable because nobody – neither people of Kashmir, nor the government – appears to be bothered by this dangerous trend.

Nobody seems to think that bumping off a child soldier (a minor-aged militant) could be defended only as long as it is a once-in-a-while anomaly, an aberration; it cannot be defended if it becomes a routine. So it’s unjustified and unjustifiable that nobody seems to weigh in all these calculations.

Catching a minor militant alive could have demonstrated the good intentions of the government that it wants the youth to shun the destructive path of violence and is sincerely ready to facilitate their return to the mainstream. Above all, a deliberate ploy of terror groups in Pakistan, I reckon, of involving children in the militancy could well have been exposed to the light.

Tweeting an appeal to the parents to strive for bringing their children back from militancy, here was an opportunity for the Kashmir police chief (IGP) to back up and buttress his appeal with some practical resolve and display of patience and fortitude – something that would have pierced far deeper than a tweet and even this option was wasted in haste.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of JKPI

Javaid Trali

Javaid Trali is a public relations professional. He has served as a Media Analyst aiding the former Chief Minister of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir. His role was to monitor ongoing media trends with regard to Jammu and Kashmir and also evaluate the information available publicly to create detailed reports for assisting the administration and government. Javaid Trali is the recipient of the prestigious International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP), a professional exchange program funded by the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.

Author

Javaid Trali

Javaid Trali is a public relations professional. He has served as a Media Analyst aiding the former Chief Minister of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir. His role was to monitor ongoing media trends with regard to Jammu and Kashmir and also evaluate the information available publicly to create detailed reports for assisting the administration and government. Javaid Trali is the recipient of the prestigious International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP), a professional exchange program funded by the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.

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