surrender-policy

Government needs to rethink the whole surrender and rehabilitation policies in J&K

1024 576 Javaid Trali

There are enough instances to establish the fact that the benefits of the surrender and rehabilitation policies were neither effectively worked out nor delivered to the ones who needed them the most.

Tehmeena Rizvi and Taitreyi Biswas

In 1995, Governor KV Krishna Rao’s administration announced the “surrender and rehabilitation policy” for the section of youth in Jammu and Kashmir who were ready to give up arms. The policy was almost identical to the policy devised for the militants in the North East and Naxalite regions. It promised Rs 1.5 lakh of fixed deposit receipts payable after 3 years, a monthly stipend of Rs 2,000 for three years, Rs 15,000 for surrendering an AK-47 rifle and Rs 3,000 for a pistol or a revolver.

The surrendered militants were trained to be part of the Ikhwan Force, a pro-government militia project, and were paid for their services. Between 1994 and 1998, these pro-government militias played an integral role in counterinsurgency operations by helping identify wanted militants.  However, the cost of the project was that the Ikhwanis (pro-government militias) found themselves being targeted by former militant allies, resulting in a new and hostile political environment in Jammu and Kashmir. This cost of the Ikhwani project, in conjunction with the failure in delivering the monetary benefits and vocational training to surrendered militants, rendered the 1995 policy ineffective.

The PDP-Congress government led by Mufti Mohammad Sayeed introduced a fresh policy on 31 January 2004. It entailed accepting India’s “integrity” and “constitution” as a precondition for surrender. It was offered “to those terrorists who undergo a change of heart and eschew the path of violence and who also accept the integrity of India and (the) Indian Constitution to encourage them to join the mainstream and lead a normal life and contribute towards prosperity and progress of the State as well as the Nation”. Many of the surrendered militants were also absorbed in Central Paramilitary Forces and Territorial Army (TA), which is the second line of defence after the Regular Indian Army. The monthly stipend was discontinued once the ex-militant secured any employment. The money could also be utilised as collateral security/margin money against loans to be availed by the ex-militant from any bank for self-employment. However, in case the ex-militant is able to secure a government job, this amount shall not be given. This policy was effective insofar as it introduced incentives for surrendering weapons and ammunition and provided monetary benefits to over 200 ex-militants in the form of cash and stipend.

Each of these policies had been built on its predecessor as a foundation, however, they have met with little success in achieving their goals of completing the socio-economic rehabilitation of former militants and, overall, decreasing the recruitment into this movement. There has been an alarming increase in the number of youths joining militant outfits despite the deaths of hundred militants in anti-insurgency operations across the valley. The recruitment rate was highest over a decade in the year of 2018. This rise occurred despite governmental efforts which engaged in increased anti-militancy efforts and massive state-wide crackdowns on insurgent networks, strategically targeting the over-ground workers (OGWs).

The impact of efforts for persuading the youth to give up arms

Indian Army continues to make efforts to prevent terror recruitment in Jammu and Kashmir and in case of youth joining terror outfits, they provide them with options to return to normalcy. Earlier, the administration had introduced three surrender policies. However, the reintegration of militants was missing from them. The first surrender policy was made in 1995. The second rehabilitation policy was made in 2004 and the third was made in 2010 on the return of ex-militants to the state. The 2010 policy touched upon psychological rehabilitation by establishing counselling centres for the returnees and their families, but rehabilitation centres were never set up.

According to media reports that quoted central intelligence agencies, the militants avoided the designated routes fearing scrutiny from Pakistani terror outfits and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s intelligence agency, which could have tracked them if they left Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) through the official transit points. Omar Abdullah, during his tenure as Chief Minister of J&K, had said that the state government was pushing for Nepal as one of the Points of Return. By Mr. Abdullah’s own admission, not one of the 241 militants came back through the designated routes of the Indira Gandhi International Airport in New Delhi, Attari (train), Wagah (bus) besides Chakan-Da-Bagh and Kaman Post in J&K. However, New Delhi refused to include return via Nepal as an official route, resulting in subsequent unrest amongst the ex-militants as the government failed to fulfil its commitment to rehabilitate them suitably. The reports further said that the surrendered militants who had crossed over from Pakistan were denied even necessities like ration cards and identity cards. None of the sectors of the government even acknowledged the possibility of recognising the Kathmandu route and built up coordination between Srinagar, Delhi, Gorakhpur and Kathmandu to facilitate the surrenders. Such an inflexibility of incoming routes which should be in the interest of the surrendered militants overlooks the politicization of the involvement of Pakistan and the other designated regional routes.

But socio-economic grievances remain

Apart from the sphere of politics and intelligence, the socio-economic condition of the families of the surrendered militants bridges itself with lack of self-dignity and social ostracization. They have been denied everything driving license, electoral photo identity card, ration card, passport and more. Pakistani wives of former militants, who had returned to the valley with the hope of starting a new life under the established rehabilitation policy of 2010, hit the streets asking the government either to provide them Indian citizenship or deport them to Pakistan. “Our appeal to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan is to address our issues sensibly. We are living a miserable life here, and our children’s future seems bleak as we are not being considered as citizens of India,” said one of the protesters. Dozens of Pakistani wives who had arrived in the valley along with their former militant husbands through the India-Nepal border under the surrender policy of 2010 are treated as “second class citizens”. “How long are we supposed to be like this? Our husbands who had crossed over the LoC for arms training in 1990 returned along with their families after Omar Abdullah-led government assured them that they will be treated at par with other citizens of J&K. Our spouses reposed their faith in the government but it seems they made a big mistake,” another protestor added. Another woman, who identified herself as Misbah, said they are not even being allowed to participate in the last rites of their family members and relatives in Pakistan. “We are the most unfortunate women in the world who could not participate in the last rites of their family members and relatives in Pakistan. We appeal to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan to have pity upon his sisters (these women) who have been living like orphans in Kashmir since their arrival here,” she added.

Many of such families regret their decision of arriving in the valley under the sheltered promises of the surrender policy. Their social and economic tribulations range from not being accepted within the community, lack of employment opportunities, denial of providing their children with basic quality education and so on. “We have been duped into this blunder (of returning to home) by Omar Abdullah and Mehbooba Mufti. They came to Pakistan and announced that (the) J&K Government had a rehabilitation scheme for us. When we reached here, we learned that there is none”. Social eradication is a pre-defining measure in terms of the communal treatment of such families. Their oblivious outlook in an unfamiliar surrounding makes them vulnerable targets of such tribulations. Acceptance is a distant dream whereas respect and acknowledgement incline towards none. “We have lost our identity. We don’t know the people we belong to. It’s a completely different language and culture here. We can’t adjust ourselves. Nobody invites us or mixes with the women and their children from Azad Kashmir or Pakistan”.

There are numerous such families and individuals who have been disillusioned by the fruits of the surrender policies. It would be wrong to deny that there is no existence of advantages and intakes from the surrender policies, yet there are enough instances to establish the fact that the benefits of the surrender policies were neither effectively worked out nor delivered to the ones who needed it the most.

 Recommendations 

  1. More incentives should be directed towards building a stronger rehabilitation platform for the surrendered militants.
  2. Quarterly or monthly surveys should be conducted to ensure that the promised rehabilitation benefits are being provided to the surrendered militants and their Pakistani wives.
  3. Enhance the engagement of surrendered militants with the rest of the society to ensure their safety that will simultaneously address their vulnerabilities as well as make their Pakistani wives acknowledge and respect the local cultural and linguistic identities for successful integration.
  4. Flexibility and recognition of routes which are in the interest of the surrendered militants keeping in mind the politicization of the involvement of Pakistan and other regions.
  5. Providing the children of surrendered militants with subsidized education in order for them to receive job opportunities.
  6. The families of the surrendered militants should be allowed to have driver’s licenses, voter IDs, passports etc. so that they can enjoy full citizenship, earn a living and gain education.

 

References

https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/promise-of-paradise-that-didnt-come-true/article4585535.ece

https://www.orfonline.org/research/reintegrating-kashmirs-ex-militants-an-examination-of-indias-surrender-and-rehabilitation-policy-56044/

https://thekashmirimages.com/2020/09/02/ex-militants-pakistani-wives-stage-protest-demands-citizenship-rights/

https://www.indiatvnews.com/news/india/kashmiri-youth-terrorism-surrender-policy-militancy-657552

Javaid Trali

Javaid Trali is a public relations professional. He has served as a Media Analyst aiding the former Chief Minister of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir. His role was to monitor ongoing media trends with regard to Jammu and Kashmir and also evaluate the information available publicly to create detailed reports for assisting the administration and government. Javaid Trali is the recipient of the prestigious International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP), a professional exchange program funded by the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.

Author

Javaid Trali

Javaid Trali is a public relations professional. He has served as a Media Analyst aiding the former Chief Minister of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir. His role was to monitor ongoing media trends with regard to Jammu and Kashmir and also evaluate the information available publicly to create detailed reports for assisting the administration and government. Javaid Trali is the recipient of the prestigious International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP), a professional exchange program funded by the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.

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